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ABSTRACT. This paper explores some of the remarkable properties that set human ecosystems apart from 
nonhuman ecosystems. The identification of these properties provides a framework for bridging the theoretical 
and methodological divide between biological ecology and human ecology. The unique information-processing 
capability of humans in ecosystems is central to this framework. We discuss several manifestations of human 
cognitive and behavioral abilities, termed "remarkable properties" of human ecosystems. A cross-cultural and 
historical approach is taken in demonstrating some of these properties. Related to these properties are the ways in 
which complex functional and dysfunctional or maladaptive processes take place in human ecosystems. We assert 
that one of the greatest challenges for human ecology is to integrate belief systems as a major component of 
human ecosystems. 
INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this article is to present some of the 
properties of human ecosystems that set them apart 
from nonhuman ecosystems. We strive to establish an 
anthropological understanding of human ecosystems, 
drawing upon holistic efforts to understand human 
cultural, i.e. nonbiological, variation and change by 
using the compositional techniques and scholastic 
background of more mature ecological disciplines 
(Stepp 1999, Kuchka 2001). 
We use the term "human ecosystem" to refer to 
human-dominated ecosystems in which the human 
species is a central agent (Vitousek and Mooney 
1997). A case could be made that the whole planet is a 
human ecosystem, in that all earth ecosystems have 
been influenced by humans (cf. Vernadsky 1945, 
Tielhard de Chardin 1959, Salthe 1993, Wyndham 
2000). However, although the boundaries may at times 
be fuzzy ,  there  are  d i f ferences  between 
conceptualizations of human ecosystems and 
nonhuman ecosystems. Certainly, there are properties 
of human ecosystems that are not found in nonhuman 
ecosystems. Although these properties may not always 
be entirely unique, they are operationally different 
enough to set them apart. Their influence on 
nonhuman systems also merits special attention, and 
they must be considered in the development of a truly 
integrated ecology that deals with the biophysical 
systems on our planet. In part then, this paper is an 
appeal for a more integrative ecology, which may be 
able to more fully address present and future crises for 
both human and nonhuman ecosystems. 
We propose here that anthropologists cannot 
understand the human condition without contributions 
from biological ecology, especially the integrative 
aspects noted by Holling (1998). Conversely, an 
anthropological perspective is necessary if biological 
ecologists are to understand human ecosystems. Thus, 
without a sustained and concerted effort at 
interdisciplinary integration we will surely fail in our 
attempt to understand human ecology at the level of 
ecosystems. 
The gap between biological ecology and human 
ecology is mainly the result of past failures to include 
relevant information and sociocultural systems in 
biological ecosystem models concerned with 
energetics and material cycles. Thus, we first present 
an example of an inclusive and far-reaching 
conceptualization of nonhuman ecosystems, then 
proceed to a conceptual model of human ecosystems 
that lays the foundation for a discussion of the role of 
information in human ecosystems as a way of bridging 
the gap between human ecology and biological 
ecology. 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF HUMAN 
ECOSYSTEMS 
Tansley (1935:306) characterized ecosystems as being 
composed of both the organisms present in an  
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ecological unit and the "... effective inorganic factors 
of its environment." The ecosystem is one of ecology's 
most important and fundamental concepts (Cherrett 
1988). One strength of the ecosystem concept is that it 
is appropriate for any situation in which the biological 
and physical interact, leading to the broad utility of the 
concept (Pickett and Cadenasso 2002). Although this 
is useful for the conceptualization of ecosystems in 
general, the limitation of the definition of ecosystems 
to the interaction of organisms and their physical 
environment is insufficient for a full understanding of 
the nature of human ecosystems. Human ecosystems 
are driven largely by the interaction of biotic and 
abiotic components through the flow of information. 
Full consideration of the flow of matter, energy, and 
information is necessary to gain an understanding of 
human ecosystems. 
 
Our view of ecosystems draws from Patten's (1978) 
definition, as it expands upon the Tansley (1935) 
conception to include both input and output 
environments (Fig. 1). In this model, Input 
Environment + System + Output Environment = 
Ecosystem. Inclusion of an output environment in this 
definition allows systems to modify their input 
environments through their outputs. Moreover, the 
inclusion of both an input and an output environment 
makes it possible to conceptually link systems 
together. Patten's conceptualization recognizes the 
significance of indirect causality through complex 
networks of interactions and flows, and permits the 
exploration of the role of information in ecosystems. A 
human system is seen as a locus in a set of  
environments that have both input and output 
environments. Additionally, Patten's definition of the 
ecosystem allows for the conceptualization of whole 
organisms, not just the physicochemical components, 
as part of a system's environment. Although this 
conceptualization is important for ecology in general, 
it is particularly important for this discussion of human 
ecosystems. An ecosystem definition that is 
sympathetic to the role of organisms, especially 
humans, in the input and output environments affords 
a better understanding of the true nature of human 
ecosystems by giving full recognition to the processes 
that drive these systems. The conceptualization of the 
ecosystem is not constrained by linking only 
organisms and physical processes. 
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To further define human ecosystems, we add the 
"multiple environments" concept to Patten's ecosystem 
(Fig. 2, Stepp 1999). The multiple environments are 
arranged in an evolutionary hierarchy, with the 
physical environment preceding and encompassing the 
biological, and so on. This conceptualization follows 
the logic of set theory, where each successive 
environment after the physical environment produces a 
new set of constraints on the system under 
consideration (Salthe 1985). An aggregated consumer 
symbol representing a human population or individual 
as a transformer of matter/energy/information lies in 
the middle (after Odum 1983). The wavy lines 
represent information flows from the multiple 
environments that pass through an epistemological 
filter/field/editor/screen for any given individual or 
population. This represents the co-occurring and often 
overlapping processes of human cognition, which are 
shaped by environmental affordances, belief systems, 
and the types of information that are available. Matter 
and energy flows are not represented in this depiction 
but are, of course, present in all human ecosystems. In 
Fig. 3, we apply the multiple environments and human 
ecosystem model to a scaled hierarchy in which 
various ecological disciplines might locate the 
appropriate environment(s) and scale of its subject 
matter (Pavao-Zuckerman 2000:35). 
PATTEN'S REMARKABLE PROPERTIES 
OF ECOSYSTEMS 
Patten (1978) framed the ecosystem concept around 
unique input and output environments that relate to 
each system. The usefulness of the ecosystem concept 
has been noted by many authors in various fields, but 
it is Patten's (1998) discussion of 20 remarkable 
properties of ecosystems that encouraged us to think at 
greater length about human ecosystems. These 20 
properties include the complexity and volume of the 
indirect pathways that connect hierarchically 
organized and mutually determining agents, each of 
which is a unique locus created by several interacting 
environments. This contribution, i.e., understanding 
individuals or populations as unique loci in a given 
environment, methodologically and theoretically helps 
to bridge the gap between ecosystems and populations. 
Patten also notes that ecosystems are cybernetic, 
adaptive model-making systems of inheritance or co-
evolution that create new niches while they construe 
benefits for and equalize energy-matter flows between 
constituent agents. These properties help maintain a 
sophisticated understanding of the organization of 
plants, animals, and matter in any given system. They 
allow us to talk about several populations and their 
population dynamics at once, not just theoretically, but 
also taking into account what we see as scientists. As 
such, we think that Patten's exercise with ecosystems 
is correctly applied to human ecosystems. 
HUMAN ECOSYTEMS AS INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 
Along with matter and energy, information is one of 
the three major components of an ecosystem. This 
ecosystem framework can be traced back to the 
systems ecologist Margalef (1958, 1968), although his 
concept of information was based on the limited 
definition used in information theory at that time. 
Information was subsequently neglected for the most 
part by biological ecologists. Beginning in the 1970s, a 
series of statements of a largely programmatic nature 
was written by ecological anthropologists about the 
need to include the role of information when studying 
human ecosystems (e.g., Flannery 1972, Adams 1973, 
Alland 1975, Dow 1975, Bennett 1976, Moran 1982, 
Butzer 1990). 
With regard to humans, Flannery (1972:400) states 
that "... [t]here is a reason why past 'ecological 
approaches' have failed, and it lies not in ecology but 
in the self-styled 'cultural ecologists.' Modern  
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ecologists, who not only analyze but even simulate 
dynamic ecosystems, [now] take into consideration 
that all populations exchange matter, energy and 
information with their environments ... In an  
ecosystem approach to the analysis of human societies, 
everything which transmits information is within the 
province of ecology ..." 
 
During this period, there was a widely held, at least 
implicit, assumption that ecosystems have flows of 
matter, energy, and information. However, Flannery's 
statement that biological ecologists were already 
studying information was not entirely true; at that 
time, mainstream biological ecologists for the most 
part did not study information in a broad context. 
Odum's (1953, 1959, 1971) classic textbook, 
Fundamentals of Ecology, trained several generations 
of ecologists. Although it contains many excellent 
chapters on matter and energy, there is almost nothing 
on information. The term does not even appear in the 
index. A survey of some of the leading ecology 
textbooks in use today shows that the situation has not 
changed much. Information is rarely mentioned, if at 
all. When it is mentioned, it is usually in reference to 
indices from information theory that were subsumed 
into measures of biological diversity (Ulanowicz 
2001) such as the Shannon Index (Shannon and 
Weaver 1949). 
Despite the situation at the pedagogical level, 
biological ecologists today are exploring ways to 
incorporate human agency into their theories and 
research. Readers of this journal are familiar with the 
efforts of the Resilience Alliance in this area. Other 
well-known examples of in-depth longitudinal 
research that integrates human institutions are the 
Long Term Ecological Research (LTER) sites across 
the United States (Grimm et al. 2000). Sociocultural 
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components of the ecosystems under study feature 
prominently in many of these studies. Efforts at 
integration by other interdisciplinary research 
consortia are detailed in other papers included in this 
special issue of Conservation Ecology. 
Anthropologists can contribute to this exciting 
development because of their long-standing 
preoccupation with the informational aspects of human 
societies such as language and other symbolic 
behavior. One of anthropology's greatest contributions 
to ecology may be in the realm of systematically 
including information into a triad of ecosystem 
components in both the input and output environments 
of specific systems. Developing an information 
ecology, i.e., a subfield of a human ecology that 
integrates matter, energy, and information, is critical 
for understanding the remarkable properties of human 
ecosystems at various levels of social organization, 
because these properties are fundamentally 
informational in nature (Stepp 1999). It was through a 
collaborative endeavor toward this goal that the 
following properties were conceptualized. 
SOME REMARKABLE PROPERTIES OF 
HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS 
The remarkable properties presented here are based on 
cross-cultural and historical observations of human 
systems. This does not necessarily imply that these are 
general principles or human universals, but rather that 
they are properties that are discernible and often 
appear in human systems and that they are worthy of 
further investigation. Rather than provide an 
exhaustive list, the following set of brief notes is 
intended to stimulate thought and discussion as we 
begin to explore the complex dynamics of human 
ecosystems. 
We have organized the presentation of these properties 
into three categories: (1) information and belief 
systems, (2) historical vectors of information in human 
ecosystems, and (3) new kinds of material, energy, and 
information flows and sinks not found in nonhuman 
ecosystems (Table 1). Future refinement of the 
relationship between these and other properties will 
undoubtedly build on and improve the present 
framework. 
Information and belief systems 
We take it as a point of departure that the 
predominance of information in human ecosystems 
leads to emergent properties. One example is the 
appearance of organized systems of meaning that are 
often paradoxical in structure and ontologically 
complex because they are located at multiple scales 
and not just in the individual (e.g., Puleston 1979, 
Gumperz and Levinson 1991). In this way, belief 
systems are capable of shaping both human behavior 
and the course of history (cf. Cronon 1983). Also, the 
dualistic black/white dichotomy and the absolutes 
typically provided by religious world views and/or 
other value systems influence both what people say 
and what they do. However, despite the uniqueness of 
human belief systems, the point is not to assign a priori 
a more privileged role to information in human 
ecosystems than those played by matter or energy; all 
of these factors are crucial. 
Belief systems 
Belief systems bridge various scales of human social 
organization. At the broadest scale, the noösphere 
concept recognizes the influence of the human mind 
on all of earth's systems, at different points in time, in 
an ever-broadening expanding consciousness (Teilhard 
de Chardin 1966, Birx 1972). We define human belief 
systems as those collective and shared epistemologies 
and ideas that influence and mediate human behavior. 
Furthermore, they are based on the human species' 
need to impose conceptual order on a vast range of 
environmental information while also striving for 
supernatural experiences. Symbolic belief systems 
may have a high degree of internal coherence and 
logic to them. They are, at times, effectively isolated 
from the "realities" of the biophysical environment. 
This isolation is created through a dynamic 
epistemological matrix composed of processes that 
serve to filter, screen, and restructure informational 
inputs from, and to, the biophysical environment. The 
dynamic nature of this epistemological matrix can, on 
occasion, allow human systems to recognize feedback 
from the biophysical environment, which potentially 
leads to changes in the belief system. This functional 
aspect of belief systems has been explored by 
anthropologists working in the cultural materialist and 
the cultural ecology traditions (Harris 1979, Rappaport 
1984). In our view, functional aspects of belief 
systems may be the exception, not the rule (see 
Canalization below). If functional adaptations were 
the norm, we would see strong correlations between 
changes in the biophysical environment and 
subsequent changes in belief systems. However, the 
persistence, not change, of belief systems across time 
and space is much more likely, even in the face of 
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dramatic changes in the biophysical environment. This 
oftentimes "closed" nature of belief systems may 
derive from limitations in the ability of humans to 
perceive "... [t]he cybernetic nature of self and world 
..." (Bateson 1972:16). 
 
Externalized cognition 
The human central nervous system has a well- 
developed capacity for externalized cognition, or the 
exteriorization of knowledge, awareness, and 
judgment, which is manifested in communicative 
signs, behavior, or material artifacts. Human cognition 
is a process by which objects and actions take on 
meanings that do not exist solely in the central nervous 
system or solely in the objects or actions themselves 
(Gumperz and Levinson 1991, Hutchins 1995). It is 
the interactions of internal and external processes that 
characterize human cognitive abilities, creating the 
potential for belief systems, institutions, and behavior 
patterns that shape the relationships between 
sociocultural and biophysical environments. 
Arising from this capacity, human ecosystems are 
often characterized by complex, human-generated 
representations of the system itself, which can be used 
to generate or reformulate goals for all or parts of the 
system (Bateson 1972:102). The goals are often reified 
and then imagined to have a foreseeable effect on the 
future. Many indirect effects arise from this, and it 
represents an important area for further investigation. 
For example, because goal formulation or planning in 
human ecosystems is affected by belief systems, 
human interactions associated with belief systems can 
interrupt feedback, whether positive or negative, from 
the sociocultural and biophysical environments. Thus, 
the planning process can be directed toward goals that 
seemingly benefit only a small segment of society, 
while thwarting the ability of other segments of 
society to represent and externalize the system 
sufficiently and accurately. As a result, human 
ecosystems are informationally driven by a 
complicated mixture of fact, fiction, and fantasy. 
Historical vectors of information in human 
ecosystems 
Information in human ecosystems contributes to 
complexity, technological change, and forms of 
historical determinism. All ecological systems possess 
degrees of complexity. However, care must be taken to 
distinguish between processes that alter the complexity 
of a system and those that complicate a system 
(Hallpike 1988, Allen et al. 1999, Allen et al. 2001). 
The elaboration of the organization of a system 
increases its complexity. This change in complexity 
involves an increase in the vertical differentiation in a 
system, adding to the levels in the system's hierarchy 
of organization, e.g., agencies within government 
ministries. Complication is an elaboration of a 
system's existing structure, e.g., elaborate and 
overlapping sets of social relationships that are 
formalized in kinship systems. 
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Thus, although complexity adds levels to the 
hierarchical organization of a system, complication 
adds to the structure within a level of a hierarchy. 
System behavior will tend to become simpler as the 
number of levels increases because of a stronger and 
more direct pathway of flow within the system. Thus, 
human ecosystems characterized by increased 
complexity may be simpler to understand than human 
ecosystems that are either complicated or lacking 
complexity. In part, this may be to due to the clearly 
defined markers that are found in complex social 
organizations to denote status within a hierarchy. 
However, the implications of this potentially improved 
understanding are less clear for the management of 
human ecosystems because of the continued existence 
of slow-changing belief systems. 
Superimposition of technostructure onto 
biostructure 
There is an increasing imposition on biostructure by 
technostructure in human ecosystems over time that 
we call "technosubstitution," which leads to an 
increase in thermodynamic flows and sinks (Kuchka 
2001). This technical and technological advance of 
human society occurs despite the conservative 
tendencies of many belief systems. One of the most 
salient examples in human cultural evolution is the 
intensification of production via technologies. 
Examples from human cultural evolution can be seen 
in the major technological transformations associated 
with agricultural intensification, such as plows that 
give access to deeper soils, steam power to run 
threshing machines, or fossil fuels to produce 
fertilizers and pesticides. During each sociotechnical 
stage of human ecosystem development, technological 
structure has supplanted the biostructure that, up until 
then, had been responsible for supplying the plants and 
animals for human subsistence. Although these 
advances lead to greater output, they do not lead to 
greater efficiency but rather to increased inefficiency 
from a thermodynamic standpoint (Pimentel et al. 
1973). The process of technosubstitution via resource 
intensification is not driven simply by feedbacks from 
population growth or pressure (cf. Boserup 1965). It is 
a process that is directly related to the semiotic 
abilities of our species. 
Historical determinism 
History strongly, and sometimes dialectically, 
determines the trajectory of human ecosystems. A few 
examples of historical determinism include (1)  
recognition of how the persistence and spread of 
institutions in cultural evolution relates to social 
structure and ideology, both of which reduce the 
randomness and increase the directionality of cultural 
evolutionary change (Hallpike 1988:208); (2) 
population growth that causes specialization and 
stratification of social relations (Hallpike 1988:237- 
252); (3) negotiations, transfers, and compromises that 
are largely dependent on prior information; and (4) an 
increasingly human-built output environment that 
dominates the informational input environment. 
A corollary of historical determinism is that, as 
political complexity increases in human ecosystems, 
information flows favor short-term gain over long-
term homeostasis. Short-term gains in the context of 
ecosystem theory connote a low level of system 
maturity and high rates of energy flow. In state-level 
societies, attention is focused on a relatively short 
period of time in which environmental manipulation is 
undertaken at the expense of long-term considerations. 
The important question here is: when, how, and under 
what conditions are long-term considerations for 
human ecosystems expressed? Although some small- 
scale societies may manage their biophysical 
environment in a sustainable manner (Anderson 1996), 
it is unclear as to the exact conditions necessary and 
sufficient for such interactions. The ongoing polarized 
debate in anthropology and the social sciences as to 
whether or not small-scale societies are ecologically 
sustainable (cf. Redford 1991) has not adequately 
addressed the underlying causes one way or the other. 
Smith and Wishnie (2000) suggest that conservation of 
this type must be overtly purposeful and not accidental 
to be truly sustainable. 
Canalization 
As a result of historical determinism, canalizing 
functions occur that can restrict the potential 
manifestations of cultural processes once they are 
widely accepted and adopted. In the early stages of 
adaptation of any cultural process, a wider variety of 
selective pressures plays a role than in later stages, 
although this is not necessarily an orthogonal function. 
Also, as Hallpike (1988) demonstrates with the 
concept of "survival of the mediocre," the persistence 
of a cultural trait, both in behaviors and institutions, 
may have little to do with its continued adaptive value 
or efficiency. Rather, it is because a given cultural 
practice or structure can muddle through a variety of 
circumstances and affords relatively easy social 
reproduction (Boyd and Richerson 1985) that it  
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continues to persist in human cultural evolution. 
For example, Harris' (1966) cultural 
materialist/functionalist explanation of the sacred cow 
complex in India is compelling with regard to its 
origin. The basic argument is that cattle in India were 
more valuable alive to serve as plow and milk animals 
and to provide dung for fertilizer and fuel. This led to 
the development of a taboo against consuming beef 
among Hindus. However, this argument does not 
account for the persistence of the taboo when keeping 
a large number of cows around ceases to be 
advantageous, such as when Indians migrate to 
Western industrialized countries. 
Other cultural features embedded in belief systems 
may undergo similar trajectories. With the loss of their 
adaptive value they may become neutral or even 
maladaptive/unsustainable, but nevertheless exhibit 
long-term persistence. Arthur's (1990) concept of 
"lock-in," in which a small advantage at the onset 
leads to a cultural feature becoming locked in as the 
system develops (cf. "generative entrenchment" in 
Wimsatt 1986) becomes relevant here. Two other 
relevant concepts are Puleston's (1979) concept of 
epistemological pathologies and Rappaport's (1977, 
1984) concept of hypercoherence. Puleston attempted 
to explain the role of information and belief in the 
collapse of Classic Maya civilization. Although he did 
not ignore the considerable evidence of environmental 
degradation, he argued that the belief among the Maya 
that the world undergoes upheaval every 256 years led 
people to simply give up when faced with mounting 
pressures from overexploitation of their biophysical 
environment. Rappaport argued that increased 
informational pathways and interactions lead to 
instability because localized pathologies can extend 
throughout the entire system. 
Power and institutions of agency 
For humans, power has its sources in the capacity for 
imagination without discernible bounds, which results 
in human refusal to admit limits to power (Russell 
1938). However, the exercise of power requires a 
motivation. Motives for the exercise of power are 
ubiquitous, and such motives may be exaggerated by 
human attempts to transcend the natural world through 
supernatural experiences. Power becomes increasingly 
important in the maintenance of human ecosystems as 
they become more complex. With the advent of the 
city and nation-state, the biophysical environment 
grows less and less important compared with the 
interpolity interactions that come to dominate the input 
and output environments. These interpolity 
interactions owe much of their nature to the goals of 
military institutions. Militaries prove particularly 
noteworthy for their contributions to technological 
change in societies, especially in the context of the 
state (Jones 1999). 
New kinds of material, energy, and 
information flows and sinks 
The remarkable success of culture in mediating human 
interactions with biological and physical environments 
leads to surplus material conditions. Consequently, 
individuals and groups can devote time to creative, 
imaginative, and supernatural experiences. These 
pursuits are often linked to material, informational, or 
energetic flows and sinks. Given such complex 
cognitive capabilities, it is perhaps inevitable that 
some informational processes emerge that are 
dysfunctional and perverse. Most of the remarkable 
properties discussed above can, in some cases, 
contribute to dysfunctional processes. The impact of 
the current global system on various ecological 
processes compels us to consider the relationship 
between these remarkable properties of human 
ecosystems and the biophysical world. Nonetheless, 
we caution against blanket statements about 
adaptability, sustainability, or functionality, because 
we still do not have a fully formed theoretical 
framework that allows for the long-term investigation 
of human ecosystems. Below are several specific 
examples of unsustainable and seemingly 
dysfunctional practices that have occurred in various 
human ecosystems over time. 
Burial, destruction and discarding of wealth 
Some cultural traits may arise that apparently lack 
adaptive value, although the authors recognize that the 
level and scale of analysis certainly circumscribe what 
might be considered adaptive or even sustainable. 
Rather than characterize these traits as adaptive or not, 
we suggest that they all have in common a tendency to 
systematically remove matter, energy, and information 
from their typical flows. This may be due to the 
emergent property of surplus capacity for production 
in human systems. As an example, we note that funeral 
customs in many places in the world remove large 
amounts of wealth from circulation and material use 
through the burial of valuables, tools, and money 
(Kuchka 2001). We see this occurring in Iron Age 
Denmark with the Vikings, who in victory made  
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offerings to lake deities in the form of war booty and 
enemy ships, which they dragged from the sea's edge 
and scuttled inland (Klesius 2000). In Ancient Egypt 
and Classic Maya civilizations, we also find burials of 
enormous amounts of wealth to serve the dead in the 
afterlife. Other forms of destruction of wealth include 
warfare and military testing, as well as planned 
obsolescence of consumer goods. 
Highly destructive intraspecific aggression 
Intraspecific aggression is not unique to humans. 
Neither is group cooperation in the commission of 
intraspecific aggressive acts (O'Connell 1988). 
However, such cooperation along with ideologies of 
unrestrained power and supernatural beliefs often 
results in catastrophic loss and destruction of human 
populations and severe alteration and destruction of 
their biophysical environments. A notable example is 
the testing and use of thermonuclear weapons of mass 
destruction. 
The degree to which human societies engage in 
violence among themselves has troubled scholars and 
philosophers at least since the origin of writing 
systems. One interpretation we offer is that human 
systems do not exist in isolation, based on Wilkinson's 
(1995) principle that any given civilization cannot be 
considered apart from others. He defines civilization 
as the systematic interaction of more than one human 
society, whether through trade, warfare, or 
subjugation. In addition, Jordan (1998) argues that 
every human group requires the existence of other 
groups to legitimize its identity. Thus, it is possible 
that intraspecific human aggression might actually 
serve the function of maintaining group identity while 
still acting as a sink for human life and property. 
Fetishism of material flows such as 
commodities and money 
Marx (1967) noted that social relationships between 
people become hidden or obscured through the process 
of economic exchange. These relationships are 
increasingly experienced as relations between material 
items that begin to take on symbolic value. Money in 
human societies plays a unique role as the universal 
sign/token of equivalent value. When it becomes a 
fetish, it affects information flows in a manner far 
beyond its base material equivalent. This behavior 
depends on the previously discussed remarkable 
properties of externalized cognition, the desire for 
supernatural experience, and the potential power that 
access to fetishes might afford. An excellent historical 
example is the commercial fetishism of tulips in 
Holland during the 16th century (Mackay 1980). A 
more recent example is found in the rise and fall of 
"dot.com" companies in the stock market. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Human ecosystems are remarkable in terms of their 
informational qualities. Belief systems tend to exclude 
feedback from multiple environments, making human 
ecosystems difficult to change. The remarkable 
properties that nurture this tendency are not presented 
to serve as interesting snippets of the human 
experience but rather as heuristic devices that may 
stimulate creative exploration toward a more 
integrated ecology. The impact of remarkable 
properties on sustainability is still largely unknown 
because a framework does not exist in which to 
consider the long-term viability of human ecosystems. 
Nonetheless, our discussion points to some tendencies 
of human behavior that contribute to a seeming 
inability to recognize or adequately respond to the 
ecological context that we live in. 
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.consecol.org/vol7/iss3/art11/responses/index.htm
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